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Abstract: 
 
Despite the fact that since the beginning of the global financial crisis of 2008 nearly nine 
years has passed, the world economy has not come to a steady trajectory of development. In 
the article it is shown that the crisis has a systemic character and it is connected with the 
managing model. 
 
The fundamentals of methodology are represented by the analysis of dynamics of macro 
indicators of 10 leading economies of the world the contribution of which exceeds 61% of 
world GDP. In this research macroeconomic, demographic indicators, indicators of money 
supply, etc. were analyzed. 
 
In the research it was revealed that the current state of the world economy is characterized 
by a number of contradictions in the field of investments, demography, central government 
debts, and monetary regulation of all leading economies of the world. It is possible to cope 
with them within the existing economic paradigm thanks to the constant economic growth, 
the opportunities of which are almost exhausted within the developed managing model 
(called by K. Marx in "the bourgeois way of production" and the uniform, global market). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2008, we have heard of many apocalyptic forecasts concerning the 
development of the world economy. It is interesting that despite the seeming 
evidence of the reasons; only some economists could make out a crisis in advance. 
But what is symptomatic: in an economic mainstream there is still no theory which 
would systemically explain the crisis reasons. As a rule, most of the economists 
distinguish the problems concerning the market of derivatives and the problems 
connected with the market of mortgage. However, a more detailed analysis is likely 
to show that reasons causing these problems result from the reasons of a deeper 
system level. And if a crisis was over, it would be possible not to focus on it. It 
would be possible to do it if the crisis was cyclic.  
 
Unfortunately, the crisis which began in August, 2008 has a system character. And it 
is impossible to find a way out without analysis and elimination of serious problems. 
Lack of any system analysis of such problems is quite explainable. The matter is that 
the modern economic science is based on liberalism philosophy, and in its purely 
economic part – on monetarism. All other scientific approaches are perceived as 
frivolous. And meanwhile, the causes of the current crisis are described by K. Marx. 
Aiming at profit forces, the capitalist (or as he/she is called "a bourgeois way of 
production") constantly increases the outputs and occupies the markets. However, 
the moment when limits of expansion of the markets are reached comes, it will be 
useless to provide more because there will be no demand. Of course, K. Marx made 
that statement only theoretically (the economy of the 19th century was far from 
being global). However, for the 21st century it became a reality. Limits of solvent 
demand are reached (or are almost reached), and the capitalist model cannot steadily 
develop in a different way (it needs a constant growth). 
 
Actually, in the USA and other leading countries of the West limits of demand were 
reached in the 1970-1980s. However, Reaganomics, credit stimulation of demand 
and disintegration of the countries of the socialist block prolonged the life of "a 
bourgeois way of production" [2]. 
 
However, by the beginning of the 21st century the market became uniform, global, 
and interest rates of central banks of the majority of developed countries had a zero 
value (Table 1) and the mechanism of credit stimulation of demand was also 
exhausted. 
 
Table 1. Value of base rates (discount rate) of the leading central banks as of 
24.01.2017 [3, 4, 5, 6] 
Refinancing rate Value, % 
European central bank 0 
Federal Reserve USA 0,75 
Bank of England 0,25 
Bank of Japan 0,3 
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All this suggests an idea again that the crisis of 2008 has a systemic character, which 
roots in the model of managing ("a way of production"). 
 
2. Methods 
 
In the research statistical methods, and also the methods of extrapolation and 
interpolation and others were widely used. The modern world economy is presented 
by 190 countries (according to MFV). However, their contribution is quite various. 
For example, ten countries give more than 61% of world GDP (if we take into 
account the purchasing power, PPS) (Table 2 and Figure 2). 
 
Table 2. Data on GDP on PPS, one billion US dollars as of 2015 [7]
2
 
№ Country GDP (PPP), bln. $ 
1 China 19392 
2 USA 17947 
3 India 7965 
4 Japan 4830 
5 Germany 3841 
6 Russia 3718 
7 Brazil 3192 
8 Indonesia 2842 
9 UK 2679 
10 France 2647 
 
Others 69053 
 World 113524 
 
In this regard it is logical to think that in the future the development of these 
countries will influence the world economy. We should also add that all the 
countries mentioned above have different cultural, historical, religious features, and 
they are located on different continents, which allow making a certain conclusion 
connected with the world economy on the whole. To analyze the tendencies of the 
world economy, we studied the dynamics of macro indicators of these countries 
within 1995-2015, including: 
 
• macroeconomic indicators (gross domestic product (taking into account the 
purchasing power and nominal estimates in the national currency), a central 
government debt (the nominal sum and the relation of a central government debt to 
GDP), inflation rates); 
• demographic indicators (population, the number of the working 
population, average age of the population); 
• indicators of the monetary market (size of M2). 
Besides, in the course of the research the authors calculated the following 
                                           
2
 Are hereinafter brought according to the International Monetary Fund 
(http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm) 
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indicators: 
• Specific weight (share) working in economy; 
• Labor productivity.  
The indicator of the specific weight (share) working in economy (PW) is 
calculated as: 
WРW
P

      (1) 
where: W – the number of the working population of the country; P – population of 
the country. The indicator of labor productivity (LP) is calculated as: 
GDPLP
P

      (2) 
The analysis is defined by the need of comparability of numerical ranks of macro 
indicators of different countries that made a separate problem. The matter is that the 
relation of the certain countries, mainly Indonesia, India, Brazil data before 1995 are 
absent in public sources. In some cases there were no data (selectively by years or 
earlier defined year) till the period of 2000. We used the methods of extrapolation 
and interpolation on the basis of the revealed tendencies. Information basis of the 
real research includes the data of: 
 
• The International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org) (concerning 
macroeconomic and demographic indicators); 
• The IEconomics portal (http://ieconomics.com/) (concerning indicators of 
money supply);  
• Department on economic and social problems of the United Nations 
(http://www.un.org/) (concerning retrospective and expected data on average age of 
the population). 
 
3. Results 
 
As it has already been mentioned, the research is based on the analysis of macro 
indicators of 10 leading economies of the world. For the analyzed 20-year period 
(from 1995 to 2015) GDP of the 10 largest economies of the world considerably 
grew (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. The dynamics of GDP during 1995-2015 of 10 leading economies 
of the world [7] 
Country Index Unit 
Years 
Growth 
rate 
Average 
growth 
rate
3
 
1995 2015 
2015/200
5 
2015/1995 
China 
GDP 
(PPP) 
Bln. $ 2231.502 19392.357 869.0% 11.4% 
                                           
3
 It is calculated by means of average geometrical 
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DP(no
minal) 
ill.nati
onal 
curr. 
6132.895 68392.453 1115.2% 12.8% 
USA 
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
7664.05 17947 234.2% 4.3% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
7664.05 17947 234.2% 4.3% 
India  
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
1426.298 7965.162 558.5% 9.0% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
12267.249 136318.25 1111.2% 12.8% 
Japan  
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
2855.739 4830.065 169.1% 2.7% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
501706.9 499095.7 99.5% 0.0% 
German
y 
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
2033.788 840.55 188.8% 3.2% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
1898.88 3025.9 159.4% 2.4% 
Russia 
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
1386.582 3717.617 268.1% 5.1% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
1523.73 80412.5 5277.3% 21.9% 
Brazil 
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
1306.744 3192.405 244.3% 4.6% 
G
DP 
(nomi
B
ill. 
nation
720.985 5904.332 818.9% 11.1% 
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nal) al 
curr. 
Indonesi
a 
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
849.679 2842.247 334.5% 6.2% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
549170.8 11540790 2101.5% 16.4% 
UK 
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
1208.777 2679.325 221.7% 4.1% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
784.243 1863.995 237.7% 4.4% 
France  
G
DP 
(PPP) 
B
ln. $ 
1337.635 2646.888 197.9% 3.5% 
G
DP 
(nomi
nal) 
B
ill. 
nation
al 
curr. 
1224.967 2182.323 178.2% 2.9% 
 
We should note that nominal estimates significantly differ from PPS estimates. It is 
quite obvious that in nominal estimates the inflationary component (see Table 4) is 
put. In this regard for the comparative analysis of the level of development of the 
different countries nominal estimates, as a rule, are not used. Certainly, and GDP 
indicator on PPS has a number of shortcomings (the main minus is connected with 
the algorithm of calculation of parity of purchasing power of currencies). However, 
this indicator is more comparable in time (as implicitly assumes a binding to 
currency with low inflation). Besides, it is the conventional indicator of assessment 
of level of economic development.  
 
Table 4. The level of inflation during 1995-2015 of 10 leading economies of the world  [7] 
Country 
Index 
Growth rate 
Average 
growth 
rate
4
 
2015/1995 2015/1995 
China Inflation rate 181.7% 3.03% 
USA Inflation rate 159.9% 2.37% 
India Inflation rate 412.3% 7.34% 
                                           
4
 It is calculated by means of average geometrical. 
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Japan Inflation rate 102.3% 0.12% 
Germany Inflation rate 135.3% 1.52% 
Russia Inflation rate 7116.8% 23.77% 
Brazil Inflation rate 627.0% 9.61% 
Indonesia Inflation rate 750.2% 10.60% 
UK Inflation rate 152.9% 2.15% 
France Inflation rate 138.6% 1.65% 
 
The influence of inflation complicates considerably the analysis of dynamics of 
nominal indicators (GDP and others). It is problematic to analyze the indicators of 
Russia. Market reforms of the 1990s and the default in 1998 were characterized by 
jumps of a hyperinflation which was reflected in nominal estimates of indicators 
(not only GDP). Despite the fact that nominal estimates are not convenient for 
comparing the countries, they are quite suitable for the analysis of dynamics of 
different nominal indicators of one country. Further, the period of 1995-2015 was 
marked literally by the explosive growth of the sizes of money supply (Table 5) and 
a central government debt (Table 6) of the leading economies of the world. 
 
Table 5. Dynamics of  M2 within 1995-2015 of 10 leading economies of the world  [7] 
Country    Index    Unit 
    Years 
Growth 
rate 
Average 
growth 
rate
5
 
1995 
2
2015 
2015/1995 2015/1995 
China 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
5.84 
1
39 
2380.1% 17.2% 
USA 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
3.63 
1
2.3 
338.8% 6.3% 
India 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
2.03 
2
5.1 
1236.5% 13.4% 
Japan 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
549 
9
21 
167.8% 2.6% 
Germany 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
1.01 
2
.6 
257.4% 4.8% 
Russia 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
0.22 
3
5.8 
16272.7% 29.0% 
Brazil 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
0.18 
2
.27 
1261.1% 13.5% 
Indonesia 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
0.22 
4
.55 
2068.2% 16.4% 
UK 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
0.44 
1
.58 
359.1% 6.6% 
                                           
5
 It is calculated by means of average geometrical 
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France 
Money Supply 
M2 
trn (national 
currency) 
0.59 
1
.79 
303.4% 5.7% 
 
We used M2 as the indicator of money supply.  
 
Table 6. Dynamics of the central government debt within 1995-2015 of 10 leading 
economies of the world [7] 
Country    Index      Unit 
     Years 
Growth 
rate 
Average 
growth 
rate
6
 
1995 2015 2015/2005 2015/1995 
China 
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
1319.843 30024.042 2274.8% 16.9% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 21.521 43.9 204.0% 3.6% 
USA 
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
4990 18992.81 380.6% 6.9% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 65.1 105.8 162.5% 2.5% 
India  
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
8544.61 91607.221 1072.1% 12.6% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 69.6 67.2 96.5% -0.2% 
Japan  
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
476974.2 1238055.04 259.6% 4.9% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 95.1 248.1 260.9% 4.9% 
Germany 
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
1027.705 2148.236 209.0% 3.8% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 54.1 70.9 131.2% 1.4% 
Russia 
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
577.58 14242.86 2465.9% 17.4% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 37.9 17.7 46.7% -3.7% 
Brazil Amount of Bill. national 357.60856 3192.405 892.7% 11.6% 
                                           
6
 It is calculated by means of average geometrical 
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government 
debt 
curr. 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 49.6 73.697 148.6% 2.0% 
Indonesia 
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. 
national curr. 
169144.60 3144829.96 1859.3% 15.7% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 30.8 27.25 88.5% -0.6% 
UK 
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. 
national curr. 
371.852 1664.517 447.6% 7.8% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 47.4 89.3 188.3% 3.2% 
France  
Amount of 
government 
debt 
Bill. national 
curr. 
679.3 2112.2 310.9% 5.8% 
Government 
debt to GDP 
% 55.4 67.0 120.8% 1.0% 
 
On the basis of the collected data we have calculated the share of the working 
population (see Table 7, calculation is made by means of formula 1) and labor 
productivity (see Table 8, calculation is made by means of formula 2) (taking into 
account the average age of the population). The data are highlighted "in bold". 
 
Table 7. Dynamics of the share of the working population and the average age within 1995-
2015 of 10 leading economies of the world [8] 
Country Index 
U
nit 
Years 
Growth 
rate 
2050 
1995 
2
2015 
2015/2005  
China 
Proportion of the 
working population % 56.2 
5
6.4 0.3   
Median age years 27.0 
3
7.0 36.9 
4
5.0 
USA 
Proportion of the 
working population % 46.9 
4
6.3 -1.3   
Median age years 30.7 
3
8.0 23.8 
4
1.1 
India  
Proportion of the 
working population % 33.5 
3
3.4 -0.3   
Median age years 21.8 
2
6.6 22.0 
3
8.6 
Japan  Proportion of % 5 5-2.4   
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the working population 1.5 0.2 
Median age years 39.6 
4
6.5 17.5 54.9 
Germany 
Proportion of the 
working population % 43.7 
4
8.9 11.8   
Median age years 38.4 
4
6.2 20.3 49.4 
Russia 
Proportion of the 
working population % 44.6 
4
9.4 10.7   
Median age years 35.0 
3
8.7 10.5 45.3 
Brazil 
Proportion of the 
working population % 47.7 
4
5.4 -4.8   
Median age years 23.8 
3
1.3 31.3 40.4 
Indonesia 
Proportion of the 
working population % 42.9 
4
4.9 4.8   
Median age years 22.8 
2
8.4 24.5 41.1 
UK 
Proportion of the 
working population % 44.5 
4
7.9 7.7   
Median age years 36.4 
4
0.0 9.9 43.5 
France  
Proportion of the 
working population % 39.5 
3
8.8 -0.4   
Median age years 36.4 
4
1.2 13.3 44.7 
 
Table 8. Dynamics of the number of the working population and labor productivity within 
1995-2015 of 10 leading economies of the world [7] 
Country Index Unit 
Years 
Gro
wth rate 
1995 2015 2015/2005 
China 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 681.00 775.00 113.8% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 3.28 25.02 763.6% 
USA 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 124.91 148.84 119.2% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 61.36 120.58 196.5% 
India  
Number of 
working population mln. of people 313.90 431.76 137.6% 
Labor ths. $ 4.54 18.45 406.0% 
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productivity per person 
Japan  
Number of working 
population mln. of people 64.57 63.76 98.7% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 44.22 75.76 171.3% 
Germany 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 35.76 40.02 111.9% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 56.87 95.97 168.7% 
Russia 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 66.20 72.32 109.3% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 20.95 51.40 245.4% 
Brazil 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 75.74 92.80 122.5% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 17.25 34.40 199.4% 
Indonesia 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 83.50 114.80 137.5% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 10.18 24.76 243.3% 
UK 
Number of working 
population mln. of people 25.82 31.19 120.8% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 46.82 85.90 183.5% 
France  
Number of working 
population mln. of people 22.81 24.95 109.4% 
Labor productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 58.64 106.10 181.0% 
 
4. Discussion 
  
4.1. From GDP Growth to the Change of the World Leader 
 
Analyzing the dynamics of GDP and PPS, we can see that the development of the 
top ten countries is not the same (see fig. 1). For example, within 1995-2015 the 
growth of economy of Japan made 169,1% while the growth of economy of China 
made 869%. 
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Figure 1. The dynamics of GDP on PPS within 1995-2000 (100% are taken from 1995) 
 
 
We should note the activation of economic growth which began in 2003-2005. The 
geography of the economic centers also changed in the early 2000s. For example, if 
in 2000 the share of the USA in the world GDP made 23,3%, and China – 7%, then 
the share of the USA was already 15,8%, and China of 28,1% [9, 10]. Within that 
period the share of India in the world GDP grew from 3,8% to 7%, and the share of 
Japan was reduced from 7,8% to 4,3%. The vector of shift of the world center to 
Asia (mainly, towards China) is quite obvious. 
 
However, it also creates a number of problems for the world economy. In particular, 
the history shows that the change of the world leader, as a rule, is painful. For 
example, Graham Ellison's researches showed that in 12 of 16 similar situations for 
the last 500 years came to an end with the large military conflict. Such a situation in 
literature is called "Thucydides's trap" [11]. It is quite probable that the regional 
military conflicts (the number of which, by the way, sharply grew from the 
beginning of the 21st century), area of fight against the economic opponents. That is 
why the term "instability export" exists in the political terminology. 
 
4.2. Nature of Economic Growth  
 
In addition we should mention the nature of the economic growth. Let's pay 
attention to Table 8. At first sight everything looks quite optimistic. All the countries 
- world leaders increased the labor productivity quite dynamically (Figure 2). 
Someone succeeded more, someone less. The high labor productivity level is an 
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indicator of the level of development of economy, intensity of economic growth and 
(at first it can seem strange) the level of welfare of the population. Growth rates of 
labor productivity influence the dynamics of the economic growth and its quality. 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of the growth of labor productivity within 1995-2000 (100% are taken 
from 1995) 
 
 
It is remarkable; all the countries of G7 in 1995 had a labor productivity level not 
less than 44 thousand dollars of the USA per 1 person, and by 2015 – not less than 
75 thousand dollars of the USA per 1 person. It is obvious that BRIC countries 
(including Indonesia) will not be able to have the same results in the near future.  
However, it is important to mention, the dynamics of growth of labor productivity is 
less than the dynamics of GDP growth. Only in Japan both indicators are at the same 
level (Table 9). 
 
Table 9.  Comparative dynamics of growth rates of GDP and labor productivity 
Country Index Unit 
Growth rate 
Average 
growth 
rate 
2015/2005 2015/2005 
China 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 869.0% 11.4% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 763.6% 10.7% 
USA 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 234.2% 4.3% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ 
per person 196.5% 3.4% 
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India  
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 558.5% 9.0% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 406.0% 7.3% 
Japan  
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 169.1% 2.7% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 171.3% 2.7% 
Germany 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 188.8% 3.2% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 168.7% 2.7% 
Russia 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 268.1% 5.1% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 245.4% 4.6% 
Brazil 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 244.3% 4.6% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 199.4% 3.5% 
Indonesia 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 334.5% 6.2% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 243.3% 4.5% 
UK 
Number of 
working 
population mln. of people 221.7% 4.1% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ per 
person 183.5% 3.1% 
France  
Number 
of working 
population mln. of people 197.9% 3.5% 
Labor 
productivity 
ths. $ 
per person 181.0% 3.0% 
 
From the theoretical point of view, this phenomenon is well explainable. From the 
statistics position this tendency is a manifestation of effect of low base and the 
relative gain in productivity of work will decrease in the future. From a position of 
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the economic theory, it is well explained by the law of the decreasing extreme 
productivity (return). We should note that quite a big period (20 years) with its 
essential technological changes was analyzed (the growth of productivity of 
computers, introduction of the robo-equipment, development of means of 
communication, etc.). But according to this law, there will be time when increase in 
labor productivity will have a negative effect on the economic growth. Certainly, for 
the economic theory it is a certain abstraction, but in the conditions of globalization 
(the uniform market of resources, work and the capital) it becomes a reality. 
Actually, it means that the economic growth is extensive by nature, and it is an 
additional restriction for the development of the world economy. 
 
4.3. Investment Dilemma 
 
Let’s return to the low interest rates. Here one more problem is covered: as the 
central bank holds a discount rate at the levels close to zero, profitability on 
"normal" (not speculative) investments is close to zero (such as profitability on 
deposits, the credits, state and corporate the bond, etc.). In the presence of inflation 
real profitability on such investments will be either zero, or negative. Negative real 
profitability is for a long time the ordinary on investments the state securities of 
Japan, the countries of the Eurozone (for example, Germany, Austria, Sweden), 
Switzerland [12]. Moreover, by estimates of the Fitch agency in 2016 of the state 
bonds for the sum of more than 10 trillion dollars bargain with negative nominal 
profitability [13]. But it is not a limit yet negative profitability in a public sector 
"pulls" for itself corporate bonds [14]. 
 
All this leads to deformation of the investment behavior. Really, what are the 
motives of the investor when capital investments have negative (it is not important if 
it is nominal or real) profitability. As a rule, such investments are means of 
preservation of the capital, though guaranteeing a stable (but a small) loss. Partially, 
it is connected with the fact that investors predict deflation in that country the bonds 
of which are acquired, which will allow receiving positive real profitability. But 
what is more important, investors are going to gain the main income from 
speculative (most often currency) operations, and investments into such bonds are 
perceived as some kind of reserve [15]. There is a paradoxical situation when on the 
market profitability is either zero or almost zero (or even negative) for the 
conservative investor, or very high – for the speculator. Potentially, it deprives of 
motivation to invest in traditional assets (bonds, deposits, etc.) which are a basis for 
real investments into economy. And the main cash flow goes into fictitious assets 
(mainly, derivatives and currency). It is well illustrated in the following drawing 
(Figure 3). The S&P Global 1200 index is on historical maxima, exceeding even 
pre-crisis (till 2008) values. We’ll remind you, the S&P Global 1200 index includes 
7 regional indexes and analyzes data on stock quotations of 1200 companies from 31 
countries of the world and 10 branches (the largest specific weight in an index 
occupies financial sector). And what is amazing the world transportations of 
resources are on historical minima (Figure 1). 
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Figure 3. Dynamics of the S&P Global 1200 [16] index 
 
 
It means that an overwhelming part of monetary flow which makes a basis of 
monetary priming of economy is connected not with real economy, but with 
financing the fictitious capital, forming more and more "financial bubbles". By the 
way, it is also the main way of "utilization" of excess liquidity which prevents the 
consumer inflation. So, inflation causes the increase in prices for the fictitious 
capital. 
 
Growth of the markets of the fictitious capital hardly helps the real sector. But 
threats from "collapse" of such bubbles are quite real. We should take into account 
the crisis of 2008 which was caused by the mortgage market of the USA. However, 
the problem was not really connected with the mortgage market but it resulted from 
as CDO and SDS. 
 
4.5. Demographic Crisis 
 
However, these are not all the problems of the world economy: as discount rates are 
close to zero (and their increase is impossible without risk of a default on sovereign 
debts) as profitability on "normal" investments is close to zero or is even negative, it 
creates a problem for the pension system which accumulates and invests different 
kinds of payments of the working population. As a rule, the pension funds follow a 
conservative investment policy (most often formed by the state) and risky assets 
cannot make investments. Then it leads to the problems of pension savings 
connected with the transfers from government budgets, which creates even more 
problems.  
 
This problem can be solved if there is a demographic increase. However, many 
countries have already faced demographic problems. In China, the USA, India, 
Japan, Brazil, France the share of the working population within the period 1995-
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2015 was the same or decreased. Different statistics give different data connected 
with the number of the working population. At the same time the term "working 
population" differs from the term "economically active population". 
 
The situation is more understandable if we analyze the dynamics of the average age 
of the population (which was monitored by the Department on economic and social 
problems of the United Nations). In all the top 10 countries the population is 
considerably growing old. Besides, according to the UN, by 2050 the problem will 
become even more critical (see Table 10).  
 
Table 10. Forecast of the average age of the population and comparison with the retirement 
age [8, 17] 
Country Index Unit 
1995 2015 2050 
Reference: 
Retirement 
age 
Male 
Fem
ale 
China 
Median 
age years 27.0 37.0 45.0 
6
0 
5
0-55 
USA 
Median 
age years 30.7 38.0 41.1 
6
5 
6
5 
India 
Median 
age years 21.8 26.6 38.6 
6
0 
6
0 
Japan 
Median 
age years 39.6 46.5 54.9 
6
5 
6
5 
Germany 
Median 
age years 38.4 46.2 49.4 
6
5-67 
6
5-67 
Russia 
Median 
age years 35.0 38.7 45.3 
6
0 
5
5 
Brazil 
Median 
age years 23.8 31.3 40.4 
6
5 
6
0 
Indonesia 
Median 
age years 22.8 28.4 41.1 
5
5 
5
5 
UK 
Median 
age years 36.4 40.0 43.5 
6
5 
6
0 
France 
Median 
age years 36.4 41.2 44.7 
6
0 
6
0 
 
Growth of the average age of the population means an increase in the number of 
pensioners and consequently, creates an additional load on the pension system and 
public finances. In fact, we face a "debt – demography" trap when a high debt does 
not raise a discount rate and a profitability of investments in economy, and in case of 
the falling demography low  profitability leads the pension system to bankruptcy. 
Unfortunately, the demographic situation will be worse in all the countries. For 
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example, now the optimum growth of the population is in Indonesia. However, 
according to the UN, by 2050-2055 the growth will be replaced by reduction [18].  
 
For many European countries (including Russia) and Japan the demographic 
problem in general becomes a matter of survival. And there are few solutions to this 
problem: increases in birth rate and encouragement of migration. Both ways are not 
that simple. As we see, the current state of the world economy is a number of 
contradictions and traps. The problems of investments, demography, pension 
system, state (and corporate) debts, poverty and many others have closely 
intertwined. Within the capitalist model of managing they are solved by means of 
ensuring constant growth of realization and profit.  
 
However, in the conditions of the global market there is no place to grow. The 
problem of demand (solvent, but not demand per se) rises very sharply as without it 
the growth is impossible. It is obvious that the credit stimulation of demand has 
exhausted its potential, having left in inheritance huge debts (both state, and 
private). Redistribution of the market among participants is not taken into account as 
it does not lead to the growth of the market.It is obvious that the crisis which began 
in 2008 has a system character, it is connected with the model of the economic 
relations (or "the way of production" as Marx called it). This crisis is influenced by 
the credit character of modern money which instead of serving commodity turnover, 
is the capital and a source of profit in itself. The loan percent put in money provides 
the constant growth of money supply and debts, harming the global economy. 
Actually, the managing model created 250-300 years ago and the monetary model 
(created a bit later) are not suitable for the global economy.  The steady rise of the 
global economy leads to a big (and actually unexplored) problem. And any way of 
artificial stimulation of demand (for example, credit stimulation) seems tricky if 
there is no change in the system of managing. 
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